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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. By Frank E. Cooper.1 Indianapolis:
The Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1965. 2 vols. Pp. xliii, 951. $35.00.
The production of this noteworthy book provides new evidence of the
maturation of administrative law as a coherent body of legal doctrine.
The much advocated agency-by-agency approach to the subject can
lead to added insights and may be useful in teaching; but here is
proof, if proof were needed, that even among the fifty states with their
wide diversities of legislation, executive structure, and judicial attitudes,
a common core of government-wide methods and conceptions has de-
veloped, giving rise to the possibility of much cross-influence of legis-
lation and judicial decisions. The total scheme has much in common
with the federal system, with which it interacts to a significant extent.
The importance of the whole is enhanced by the seemingly accelerated
extension of administrative services and controls as the welfare and
regulatory functions of government are enlarged.
The author's text is written with simplicity and clarity under chapter
titles and subsidiary headings that provide a convenient, well struc-
tured framework. The organization of the book largely follows
the arrangement of the Revised Model Administrative Procedure
Act, in the preparation of which Professor Cooper served as a consult-
ant. The work was produced under the auspices of the American
Bar Foundation and the University of Michigan Law School. Dean
E. Blythe Stason, who was chairman of the committees which drafted
the Model Act and Revised Model Act, as well as director of the Bar
Foundation and Professor Cooper's teacher at an earlier time, has sup-
plied an introduction.
Professor Cooper has had a noteworthy career as a practitioner and
teacher of administrative law, yielding experience which illuminates his
approach and enhancing the value of his judgments time after time.
Most of these judgments, except for some with respect to judicial
review of agency action, seem to be little influenced by the generalized
antipathy to administrative agencies which he also expresses, often by
means of side remarks; for he is too good a lawyer not to comprehend
the functions and needs of administrative agencies, as well as the in-
terests of parties appearing before them. He makes only sparing ref-
erence to the literature of administrative law, but frequently cites
American Bar Association committee reports,2 the so-called "minority
report" of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Pro-
cedure,3 and the report of the Task Force on Legal Services and Pro-
cedure of the second Hoover Commission.4
The first three chapters, dealing with some pertinent history and
then with the separation and delegation of powers, present an obstacle
to appreciation of the book for those who disagree with some of Pro-
'Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
2 ABA SPECIAL Comnm. ON ADimsTRATImV LAW, REPORTS (1933-1939).
AniNisnTRATv PROCEDURE n GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. iO, 77th
Cong., ist Sess. (194i). The "minority report" consisted of the Additional Views
and Recommendations of Messrs. McFarland, Stason, and Vanderbilt.
4 COMMsISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE ExEcUTIVE BRANCH OF THE (QVERN-
mENT, TASK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERViCES AND PROCEDURE (1955),
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fessor Cooper's general views. The historical account, which is brief,
centers almost entirely on the development of administrative procedure
reform in the United States. The discussion of the separation and
delegation of powers deals in large part with the decay of traditional
doctrines and the difficulty of controlling certain tendencies toward
excess, which are said to result from the bestowal of overly broad dis-
cretion upon administrative agencies (pp. 35-42). The author is care-
ful to attribute these tendencies only to "some" agencies, and to assert
merely that certain evil consequences, such as shortcutting procedures
or stretching authority, "may" or "can" result-not that they in-
evitably will. No account is given of the reasons for the establishment
of administrative agencies or their characteristics, against which the
significance of the author's assertions could be gauged. The agencies
simply come into existence, receive certain authority, and need to be
checked. The net impact of the discussion in these first three chapters
concerning the value of administrative powers is therefore largely
negative 5 and, it seems fair to say, is lacking in the realistic quality
that appears elsewhere in the book.6 In the chapter on delegation
there is, nevertheless, a useful enumeration of the "factors that moti-
vate [judicial] decision as to sufficiency of limitation on administra-
tive discretion" (p. 7). These factors include such significant items
as the traditions in particular fields of administration, the kinds of
private interests affected, and the varieties of procedure and judicial
review which accompany the exercise of discretion under particular
statutes.
After three more chapters dealing respectively with definitions,
constitutional rights to notice and hearing, and public information,
the body of Professor Cooper's book consists of three chapters on rule-
making, including judicial determination of the validity and applica-
'Professor Cooper comforts the reader at one point (pp. 20-21) with Ernst
Freund's perception of a "gradual and rather unconscious drift . . . toward dis-
placement of discretion." Nowhere does Cooper document such a tendency. In
the chapter on delegation he indicates the contrary by recognizing that in zoning,
public health and safety regulation, and certain varieties of price fixing, it is
difficult or impossible to prescribe meaningful standards to limit agency discretion
(pp. 62-67). Except for price fixing, these are areas in which administrative
powers are steadily being expanded.
'The usual discriminating realism disappears in various passages of the book
where Professor Cooper expresses dislike for administrative agencies. At one
point he quotes with relish a Florida court's denunciation of "the administrative
process as a whole" (pp. 684-85). Elsewhere the statement is made that "in
almost every state agency there are some officials who are so imbued with a
missionary zeal to further the public interests served by the agency that they are
emotionally incapable of making findings of fact fairly and objectively in certain
cases" (p. 723). To persons impressed by the somnolence or timidity, rather than
the zeal, of many state agencies this statement seems exaggerated, to say the
least. The feeling behind Professor Cooper's belief may not be unrelated to that
which produces a reference to "the staunchest exponents of administrative
absolutism" (p. 723). These people are unnamed, and one inevitably wonders
what advocates of absolutism in this country he refers to. Cooper may have
alluded to them in an earlier passage as "those who dub the whole separation of
powers concept as an unhappy anachronism, the product of an 'Aristotelian
theoretician'" (p. i6). A footnote reference is to the first two pages of J. LAwDIS,
T=x AmnUSTP.Anvx PROCESS (1938). I find no such characterization of Mon-
tesquieu or anyone else at that point in Landis's text or in other relevant passages
of it. Landis does not denigrate the theory of separation of powers, but only
some modern encrustations upon it which he deems to be unsound.
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tion of regulations; five chapters on adjudication, including specific
treatment of licensing and res judicata; and five chapters on judicial
review, including a brief treatment of certain aspects of review of reg-
ulations. The author restricts his discussion of adjudication to "con-
tested cases" as defined in the original and Revised Model Administra-
tive Procedure Acts. A contested case in this sense is a proceeding
in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are required
by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hear-
ing. Excluded from the Acts and from detailed discussion in this
book are the great body of informal agency proceedings to which no
requirement of opportunity for hearing attaches. The author takes
note of the existence of "informal adjudication" and recommends legis-
lation to require that hearings be made available in all adjudications
that may substantially affect important rights of persons or property
(p. 126). Improvement of administration in areas which would re-
main subject to informal processes is a different subject, not sought to be
covered here.
To this reviewer, chapter V, "Constitutional Requirements of No-
tice and Opportunity to be Heard," is the best in the book. Its twenty-
five-page discussion summarizes cogently the considerations that have
influenced judicial decisions in spelling out these requirements, includ-
ing traditions in particular fields of administration, the impact of par-
ticular administrative determinations on private persons, and the na-
ture of the public interests to be served. Trends toward greater judicial
sensitivity in recent times to the actual impact of administrative ac-
tions on such people as license holders and public employees are recog-
nized.
An outstanding feature of Professor Cooper's book is the emphasis
which is placed on statutes as well as judicial decisions. The treat-
ment of many of the topics commences with a generalized analysis,
in which pertinent provisions of the Revised Model Act and of the
general administrative procedure statutes of the states that have en-
acted these laws are set forth. A more detailed discussion of significant
cases follows. In the treatment of judicial decisions the statutory pro-
visions under which they are rendered are usually noted. Suggestions
for statutory drafting are often given. The resulting emphasis is valu-
able from the standpoint of both accurate understanding and improve-
ment of law. Statutory terms provide, in addition, a core about which
the discussion of decisions is organized, so as to avoid needless pro-
liferation of case citations.
Little would be gained by discussion in this review of the numerous
detailed points of agency procedure with which the author deals,
on many of which he expresses judgments. A goodly number of these
are controversial. Whether all staff memoranda furnished to the hear-
ing officer or the members of the agency in deciding a case, even though
they deal only with questions of law, must be made available to
the parties, as the author believes and the Revised Model Act provides,
and whether agency heads or other deciding officers should be permitted
to engage in ex parte consultation only with personal assistants on
questions of law are open to debate. The necessary relation between
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the evidentiary record and the final decision in a proceeding is, on the
other hand, cogently stated in a manner which captures the essence of
indispensable fairness in this aspect of institutional decision making
(P. 446).
Professor Cooper's chapters dealing with various aspects of judicial
review of agency action are influenced more largely than the rest of the
book by his broad distrust of administrative agencies. Whether this
distrust stems from an a priori philosophy of administrative law or
from experience, it contributes grounds for certain conclusions of ques-
tionable soundness. These conclusions are influenced also by an un-
critical approval of virtually all courts and their work, which leads
Cooper to advocate, for example, that judicial review of state agency
action be in the trial rather than in the appellate courts. Review in
trial courts is, he says, "more efficient" because trial judges "can take
more time than can appellate courts to explore carefully, with the assist-
ance of counsel, the complexities of the administrative record and un-
ravel the skeins of proof (which have an unfortunate habit, in admin-
istrative proceedings, of becoming badly tangled)" (p. 612). This view
ignores the incongruity of having a single local judge review the work
of a state body or official such as a public utility or insurance com-
mission, and takes no account of the not uncommon mediocrity and po-
litical motivation (in cases involving controversial public issues) of
elected local judges in many of the states. Professor Cooper also advo-
cates liberal use of injunctions against agency action, both in the absence
of other means of review and as an adjunct to them (pp. 632-36); avail-
ability of declaratory judgment proceedings without much reference
to the exhaustion of administrative remedies principle (pp. 636-4o);
and, in accordance with the Revised Model Act, the addition of "clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion" to arbitrariness and abuse of dis-
cretion as a ground for setting aside agency action (pp. 756-72).
For Professor Cooper, the words courts use in explaining reversals
of administrative action are often to be understood in an expanded sense
which buttresses his unfavorable estimate of what agencies are likely
to do. The frequent "heady exuberance" of agencies, which sometimes
leads them to stretch their statutory authority to an extent that
places their actions "beyond or even at variance with those of the
statutes they are created to administer," is evidenced, he says, "by
a number of cases in which state courts have had occasion to strike
down administrative orders on these grounds" (pp. 693-94). Some of
the cases he cites do indeed bear out his contention, although rarely in
the sinister sense that would attribute a calculated grab for power
to the agencies involved.7 Many of the cases appear to involve rather
ordinary differences of interpretation of the governing statute, as to
'E.g., Obradovich Liquor License Case, 386 Pa. 342, 126 A.2d 435 (i956), in
which the agency applied tests to the transfer of liquor licenses that were not
specified in the statute with respect to license issuance (two judges dissented,
however, from the reversal of the agency's action); Arnold Home, Inc. v. Labor
Mediation Bd., 338 Mich. 315, 6o N.W.2d 9o5 (i953), in which the Board
attempted to use its authority to conduct a strike vote in order to conduct a vote




which the agency does not seem to have been indubitably wrong. In
one case,8 for example, a local board of health thought its statutory
power to make such "regulations as it deems necessary . . . for the
public health, the prevention or restriction of disease, and the pre-
vention, abatement or suppression of nuisances" authorized it to con-
vey broader power to the health commissioner with respect to the reg-
ulation of garbage disposal than four of the seven supreme court judges
thought it did. The other three judges agreed with the agency; but the
court, although it sustained the constitutionality of the statute, spoke
of the duty of the courts "to confine boards, commissions and officers
to the exercise of powers which are regulatory and administrative," to
the end that "we shall continue a government of laws and not of men."
In another case 9 the question was whether an elaborate revision of the
state banking code narrowed the grounds on which the department of
banking had previously been authorized to disapprove mergers that
would transform existing banks into branches. The court characterized
the amendment as "poorly drawn" but differed with the department
as to its interpretation, apparently with some reluctance. In order
to bring its reversal of the order within the scope of the certiorari-
type review to which the court was confined, it spoke of the exercise
by the agency of "powers beyond those granted or possessed." In still
another case 10 the agency's narrow interpretation of the circumstances
that would cause an occupational injury to be compensable bad the
support of a decision of the supreme court five years earlier, which
was here overruled "in so far as it holds to the contrary." The court
said, however, that the agency had "superimposed" a requirement
upon those specified in the statute.
None of these aspects of Professor Cooper's book detracts signifi-
cantly from the major contribution it makes to the study and practice
of administrative law. It unlocks a storehouse of statutes, decisions,
and insights that will be of great continuing value. It is to be hoped
that the pocket supplements, for which the volumes are equipped, will
be provided well into the future.
RALPH F. FUCHS
LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT. By
Michael I. Sovern.1 New York: The Twentieth Century Fund. 1966.
Pp. ix, 270, 54 (notes). $6.oo.
Professor Sovern's study, five years in preparation,2 has been well
worth the wait. Addressed principally to the concerned layman, the
8Weber v. Board of Health, 148 Ohio St. 389, 74 N.E.2d 331 (x947) (cited
p. 42).
8Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. Myers, 388 Pa. 444, 13o A.2d 686 (19%7)
(cited p. 694).
10 Brown v. Industrial Comm'n, 9 Wis. 2d S5, ioi N.W.2d 788 (196o) (cited
p. 694).
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
1 Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
'See Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination,
62 COLum. L. REv. 563 (1962).
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